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There	   is	  no	  animal	  geography	  without	  ethics.	  The	  very	  coupling	  of	   the	  words	  gives	  
rise	  to	  an	  ethical	  endeavor;	  an	  acceptance	  that	  animals	  have	  a	  geography,	  a	  making	  
visible	   of	   animals	   within	   our	   human	   geography	   and	   scholarship,	   an	  
acknowledgement	  that	  our	  relationship	  with	  animals	  has	  consequences.	   	  For	  some,	  
this	   ethical	   endeavor	   extends	   to	   politics	   and	   includes	   engaged	   activism	   or	   to	  
individual	  commitment	  such	  as	  not	  to	  eat	  meat,	  not	  to	  ‘own’	  a	  pet,	  not	  to	  visit	  zoos	  
and	   so	   on.	   This	   is	   a	   personal	   choice	   but	   at	   a	   broader	   level,	   animal	   geography,	   in	  
recognizing	  animals	  as	  co-­‐respondent	  subjects	  gives	  them	  a	  moral	  placing	  within	  the	  
academy	  that,	  arguably,	   they	   rarely	  enjoyed	  before.	  This	   final	   report	  considers	   the	  
contribution	  of	  animal	  geography	  and	  animal	  geographers	  to	  a	  more	  informed	  ethics	  
of	  human-­‐animal	  relations,	  one	  that	   increasingly	  confounds	  an	  over	  simplistic	  view	  
of	   animals	   as	  merely	  moral	   patients	   to	   suggest	   an	   ethics	  which	   guides	   a	   broader,	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‘If	  she	  shut	  the	  hurting	  eye	  and	  looked	  with	  the	  other,	  everything	  was	  clear	  and	  
flat;	  if	  she	  used	  them	  both,	  things	  were	  blurry	  and	  yellowish,	  but	  deep’	  (Le	  Guin,	  
1990:	  31)	  
	  
There	  are	  various	  reasons	  why	  geographers	  and	  other	  social	  scientists	  have	  recently	  
turned	   their	   attention	   to	   non-­‐human	   animals.	   Some	   of	   these	   (from	   the	   draw	   of	  
posthumanism	   to	   the	   methodological	   challenge	   of	   getting	   beyond	   solely	   human	  
forms	   of	   accounting)	   are	   considered	   in	   earlier	   reports	   (Buller,	   2013a;	   2014).	   	   For	  
many	   people	   however,	   academics	   and	   otherwise,	   a	   driving	   concern	   in	   the	  
investigation	   and	  understanding	  of	   human-­‐animal	   relations	   remains	   that	   of	   ethics.	  
Ethical	   considerations,	   both	   implicit	   and	   explicit,	   are	   rarely	   if	   ever	   absent	   in	  
contemporary	   human-­‐animal	   studies,	   whether	   the	   authors	   adopt	   the	   (misused)	  
epithet	   ‘critical’	   or	   not.	   	   It	   is	   commonplace,	   when	   submitting	   a	   paper	   to	   a	   peer-­‐
reviewed	   journal	   that	  publishes	  work	   in	   ‘human-­‐animal	  studies’,	   to	  receive	  at	   least	  
one	  reviewers’	  report	  condemning	  (or	  supporting)	  the	  author’s	  stated	  (or	  unstated)	  
ethical	  position	  with	  regards	  to	  the	  forms	  of	  human-­‐animal	  interaction	  under	  study.	  
It	   has	  become	  hard	   to	  write	   and	  not	   to	   kill	   –if	   only	  by	   inference.	   	   For	   some	  more	  
radical	  commentators,	  entire	  oeuvres	  can	  be	  summarily	  dismissed	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  
what	  is	  held	  to	  be	  a	  scholar’s	  unacceptable	  ethical	  stance	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  human	  
treatment	   of	   animals.	   In	   this	   third	   and	   final	   paper	   I	   consider	   the	   contribution	   of	  
animal	  geography	  and	  animal	  geographers	   to	   these	  ethical	  questions	  and	  debates.	  
There	   are	   three	   sections.	   The	   first	   looks	   at	   the	  ways	   in	   which	   accounts	   in	   animal	  
geography	  have	  contributed	  to	  traditional	  ethical	  discussions	  about	  ‘the	  animal’.	  The	  
second	  opens	  the	  question	  of	  the	  ethical	  positioning	  of	  the	  animal	  geographer.	  The	  
final	  section	  explores	  a	  number	  of	  new	  ethical	  questions	  that	  contemporary	  studies	  
of	  human-­‐animal	  relationality	  have,	  either	  directly	  or	  indirectly,	  raised.	  
	  
1.	  	  Ethical	  places	  
	  
‘So	   long	   as	   there	   is	   recognizability	   and	   fellow,	   ethics	   is	   dormant.	   It	   is	   sleeping	   a	  
dogmatic	   slumber.	   So	   long	   as	   it	   remains	   human,	   among	   men,	   ethics	   remains	  
dogmatic,	  narcissistic	  and	  not	  yet	  thinking.	  Not	  even	  thinking	  the	  human	  that	  it	  talks	  
so	  much	  about’	  (Derrida,	  2009:	  108)	  
	  
Geography’s	   own	   ‘animal	   question’	   (the	   ‘place’	   of	   the	   animal	   in	   geographical	  
explanation)	   is	  profoundly	  ethical.	   In	  one	  of	   the	  defining	  early	  volumes	  of	   the	  sub-­‐
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discipline,	  Lynn	  writes	  of	  the	  new	  animal	  geographers:	  ‘we	  are	  remapping	  the	  moral	  
landscape	  of	  animal-­‐human	  relations,	  revealing	  a	  diverse	  world	  of	  ethically	  relevant	  
nonhuman	  beings’	  (1998a:	  280).	  Moreover,	  and	  this	  from	  a	  prescient	  chapter	  in	  the	  
other	   defining	   volume	   of	   those	   early	   days,	   such	   uneven	   animal-­‐human	   relations	  
themselves	   ‘have	  an	  ethical	   ‘resonance’	  or	   ‘freight’,	   even	   if	   they	  do	  not	   fall	  within	  
the	   compass	   of	   ethics	   in	   terms	   of	   either	   formalized	   systems	   of	   thought	   or	   more	  
messy	  emotional/moral	  ‘systems’	  of	  judgment’	  (Jones,	  1990:	  268).	  	  
If	  animal	  geography,	  along	  with	  contemporary	  ‘animal	  studies’	   in	  general,	   is	  
about	   making	   animals	   –	   their	   presence,	   agency	   and	   materiality	   as	   well	   as	   their	  
ordering,	  use	  and	  treatment	  by	  humans	  –	  visible	  and	  account-­‐able,	  then	  this	  surely	  
has	   been	   an	   intentional	   challenge	   to	   animals’	   longstanding	   (spatial,	   moral	   and	  
relational,	  as	  well	  as	  social	  and	  scientific)	   invisibility	  wrought	  through	  the	  practices	  
and	  ontologies	  of	  modernism	  and	  humanism	  (Berger,	  1981;	  Wolch	  and	  Emel	  1998;	  
Smith,	  2001).	  Making	  visible	  has	  eminently	  ethical	  (and	  critical)	  implications	  (Butler,	  
2007).	  	  
	   Nonetheless,	  while	   a	   good	  many	   of	   the	   advocates	   and	   practitioners	   of	   the	  
emergent	   sub-­‐discipline	   pursue	   an	   explicitly	   radical	   and	   critical	  moral	   agenda	  with	  
respect	  to	  the	  human	  treatment	  of	  animals	  (see	  below),	  animal	  liberationism	  per	  se	  
was	   never	   the	   sole	   casus	   belli	   or	   even	   the	   raison	   d’etre	   of	   animal	   geography.	   Its	  
ethical	   and	  moral	   lineage	   draws	  wider,	   as	  much	   from	   feminist	   ethics	   (Plumwood,	  
1993;	  Adams	  and	  Donovan,	  1995;	  Adams,	  2003;	  Birke,	  2007;	  Hovorka,	  2015),	   from	  
environmental	   ethics	   (Philo,	   1995;	   Whatmore	   and	   Thorne,	   1998;	   Wolch,	   2002;	  
Valentine	   2004)	   and	   from	   care	   ethics	   (Engster	   2006;	   Popke,	   2006;	   Donovan	   and	  
Adams	   2007;	   McEwan	   and	   Goodman,	   2010),	   though	   of	   course,	   these,	   and	  
particularly	  feminist	  ethics,	  also	  influenced	  the	  emergence	  of	  liberationist	  thought	  as	  
Singer	  (1975)	  acknowledges.	  Animal	  geography	  might	  thus	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  component	  
of	  the	  wider	  ‘moral	  turn’	  in	  our	  own	  fin	  du	  dernière	  siècle	  human	  geography	  (Lynn,	  
1998b;	  Proctor	  1998)	  in	  which,	  what	  Barnett	  (2012)	  calls	  an	  ‘ethics	  of	  vulnerability’	  
combines	  with	  an	  acceptance	  of	  the	  animal	  as	  the	  new	  and	  vulnerable	  ‘other’	  within	  
our	  moral	  and	  social	  theory	  (Steeves,	  1999;	  Mathews,	  2012).	  
	  	   In	   the	   face	  of	  an	  already	  elephantine	   literature	  and	  a	   set	  of	  well-­‐rehearsed	  
yet	   endlessly	   debated	   arguments	   on	   the	   moral	   and	   philosophical	   status	   of	   the	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animal,	   the	   question	   we	   need	   to	   ask	   is	   what	   has	   been	   animal	   geography’s	   more	  
specific	  contribution	  to	   this	  broader	  ethical	  debate.	   	  Three	  answers	  spring	   to	  mind	  
(though	  there	  are	  certainly	  more).	  The	  first	  lies	  in	  our	  subject	  matter,	  those	  ‘animal	  
spaces	  and	  beastly	  places’	   (Philo	  and	  Wilbert,	  2000)	  that	  range	  from	  the	  body,	   the	  
home,	  the	  zoo,	  the	  farm,	  the	  neighbourhood,	  the	  lab,	  the	  city,	  the	  brownfields,	  the	  
greenfields	   and,	   beyond	   all	   that,	   the	  wild.	   Animal	   geographers	   provide	   a	   dynamic	  
spatial	   framing	   for	  what	   Proctor	   (1998)	  might	   call,	   a	   ‘descriptive	   ethics’;	   revealing	  
how	   different	   human	   material	   and	   semiotic	   constructions	   and	   orderings	   of	  
space/place	   create	   differential	   conditions	   for	   moral	   behavior	   and	   social/ethical	  
practice	  with	  respect	  to	  non-­‐humans.	  ‘This	  geography	  of	  (un)ethical	  relations’,	  writes	  
Jones	   (2000:	   288),	   ‘involves	   the	   spaces	   and	   patterns	   by	  which	  we	   classify	   and	   act	  
upon	   differing	   groups	   of	   animal	   and	   other	   non-­‐human	   others’.	   Whatmore	   and	  
Thorne’s	   (1998)	   analysis	   of	   the	   ‘precarious	   geographies	   of	  wildlife’	   and	   the	   ‘moral	  
geographies	   of	   wilderness’	   is	   an	   early	   example,	   along	   with	   Anderson’s	   paper	   on	  
Adelaide	   zoo	   (Anderson	   1995)	   but	   more	   recent	   work,	   for	   example	   Jones	   (2003),	  
Palmer	   (2003),	   Jerolmack	   (2009)	   Braverman	   (2011),	   Barua	   (2014)	   and	   Srinivasan	  
(2014)	  explores	  how	  different	  socio-­‐spatial	  categories,	  be	  they	  the	  countryside,	  the	  
city,	   the	   zoo,	   the	   ‘dwelt	   ecologies’	   of	   northern	   Indian	   forests	   or	   seashore	  
conservation	   sites,	   provide	   distinctive	   frames	   for	   investigating	   the	   differentially	  
constructed	  ethics	  of	  human-­‐animal	  interaction	  and,	  consequently,	  the	  varied	  ways	  
we	   live	   together	   with	   non-­‐humans.	   Matless’	   (1999)	   sense	   of	   how	   the	   distinctive	  
nature-­‐cultures	  of	   individual	  places	  –	  here	   the	  Norfolk	  Broads	  –	  help	  establish	   “an	  
animal	   geography	   which	   does	   not	   necessarily	   begin	   with	   matters	   of	   rights	   or	  
welfare”,	   is	   suggestive	   of	   an	   emergent	   ethics	   to	   come.	   Space,	   write	   Bolla	   and	  
Hovorka	  (2013:	  57)	  in	  their	  elucidation	  of	  a	  ‘transspecies	  spatial	  theory’,	  ‘takes	  on	  an	  
active	   role	   in	   the	   production	   and	   reproduction	   of	   human-­‐animal	   positionality’.	  
Placing	  animals	  in	  wild	  and	  other	  spaces	  also	  confers	  certain	  ethical	  responsibilities	  
upon	   humans.	   In	   this	  way,	   ‘the	   place	   of	  wildlife	   in	   the	   city’,	  write	   Van	  Doren	   and	  
Rose	   (2012:	   18),	   ‘opens	   our	   engagement	   with	   the	   urban	   in	   ethically	   compelling	  
ways’.	   Elsewhere,	   increasingly	   technologized	   spaces	   of	   human-­‐animal	   interaction,	  
such	  as	  for	  example	  the	  modern	  automated	  milking	  parlor,	  the	  animated	  pig	  pen	  or	  
the	   electronic	   zoo,	   generate	   not	   only	   new	   spaces	   for	   emergent	   and	   novel	   ethical	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practices	   but	   also	   new	   moral	   agencies	   (Davies,	   2000;	   Holloway,	   2007;	   Driessen,	  
2014a).	  
	  
2.	   (Un)ethical	  treatments	  
	  
We	  don’t	  think	  of	  hogs	  as	  animals,	  not	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  cats	  and	  dogs	  and	  deer	  and	  
squirrels.	  	  We	  say	  ‘pork	  units’.	  What	  they	  are	  Bob,	  is	  ‘pork	  units’	  -­‐	  a	  crop	  like	  corn	  or	  
beans	  	  (Ribeye	  Clark	  in	  Annie	  Proulx,	  2002:	  302).	  
	  
Of	  course	  there	  are	  animal	  geographers	  who	  maintain	  that	  this	   is	  not	  enough.	  This	  
short	   article	   is	   not	   the	   place	   to	   rehearse	   the	   moral	   arguments	   that	   underlie	   the	  
commitment	  of	  a	  great	  many	  animal	  geographers	  to	  a	  more	  engaged,	  normative	  and	  
highly	  critical	  stance	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  various	  aspects	  of	  humanity’s	  treatment	  of	  
animals	   (as	   food,	  as	  experiment,	  as	   spectacle	  or	  as	   companion)	   that	   they,	   through	  
their	   scholarship,	   reveal.	   Such	   arguments	   pervade	   virtually	   all	   aspects	   of	   animal	  
geography	  in	  different	  ways,	  and	  have	  done	  so	  since	  the	  beginning	  (Wolch	  and	  Emel,	  
1998;	   Johnston,	   2008;	   DeMello	   2010).	   Yet	   they	   do	   not	   define	   it.	   For	   some	   they	  
should;	  a	  more	  humanitarian	  humanism,	  even	  when	  it	  makes	  visible	  the	  mechanisms	  
and	   consequences	   of	   human	   domination,	   is	   not	   in	   itself	   transformative.	   Being	  
transformative	   and	   emancipatory	   is	   a	   second	   response	   to	   the	   question	   of	   what	  
animal	  geography	  has	  brought	  to	  the	  ethical	  table.	  
	   In	  a	  pair	  of	  articles,	  Wilkie	  (2013a;	  2013b)	  perceives	  a	  growing	  tension	  in	  the	  
broader	  field	  of	  human-­‐animal	  studies,	  first,	  over	  the	  capacity	  of	  humanist	  ethics	  to	  
genuinely	  reach	  beyond	  the	  human	  (Pederson	  2011;	  Steiner,	  2014;	  Weitzenfeld	  and	  
Joy,	  2014)	  and,	   second,	   regarding	   the	  degree	   to	  which	  a	  more	   radical	   critique	  and	  
direct	  personal	  engagement	  should	  constitute	  the	  foundational	  moral	  repertoire	  of	  
such	   studies	   (Best,	   2009;	  Birke,	   2009;	   Peggs,	   2013).	   This	   tension	   increasingly	   plays	  
out	  in	  a	  seeming	  bifurcation	  between	  ‘animal	  studies’	  and	  their	  critical	  counterpart.	  
Critical	  Animal	  Studies,	  formalized	  by	  capital	   letters,	  an	  acronym	  (CAS),	  an	   institute	  
and	   a	   journal,	   has	   emerged	   over	   the	   last	   20	   years	   as	   a	   component	   of,	   yet	   also	  
counter-­‐narrative	   to,	   the	   renewed	   academic	   interest	   in	   ‘the	   animal’	   (for	   two	  
counter-­‐narrative	   examples,	   see	   Cole,	   2012	   and	   Cole	   and	   Stewart,	   2014).	   Critical	  
animal	  studies	  also	  offers	  a	  focus	  for	  more	  specific	  and	  active	  opposition	  to	  what	  is	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held	   to	   be	   the	   ethically	   unacceptable	   material,	   instrumental	   and	   conceptual	  
treatment	  of	  animals	  by	  humans	  (Nocella	  et	  al.,	  2012).	  	  
As	  an	  ethical	  position,	  CAS	  are	  avowedly	  ‘liberationist’,	  drawing	  on	  anarchist	  
political	  theory,	  feminism,	  intersectionality,	  critical	  race	  studies,	  posthumanism	  and	  
activist	  political	  engagement	  (Best	  et	  al,	  2007;	  Twine,	  2010;	  Taylor	  and	  Twine,	  2014;	  
White,	  2015).	  Critical	  animal	  studies	  are	  explicit	   in	  their	  ‘normative	  commitment	  to	  
the	   removal	   of	   all	   forms	   of	   animal	   abuse’,	   which	   include	   the	   killing	   and	   eating	   of	  
animals,	  as	  well	  as	  their	  embrace	  of	  emancipatory	  and	  ‘‘engaged	  theory’	  as	  means	  of	  
achieving	   social	   change	   (Taylor	   and	   Twain,	   2014:	   6).	   As	   such,	   CAS	   take	   issue	  with	  
what	  Twine	  	  (2010:	  21)	  calls,	  rightly	  or	  wrongly,	  the	  ‘docile	  ethics’	  and	  the	  residual	  
humanism	   (Wolfe,	   2010a)	   of	   much	   human-­‐animal	   scholarship.	   Others	   go	   further,	  
first,	   by	  declaiming	  what	   they	   see	   as	   the	   comfortable	   alignment	   and	   complicity	   of	  
animal	   studies	  with	   animal	   testing,	   animal	   agriculture	   and	   vivisection	   and,	   second	  
and	   perhaps	   more	   paradoxically	   (Twine,	   2014)	   by	   rejecting	   the	   elitism	   of	   post-­‐
humanism	  (Nocella	  et	  al	  2014;	  White,	  2015).	  	  
For	  Wilkie	   (2013),	   the	   growing	  distance	  between	   ‘critical’,	   and	  what	   others	  
(Best,	  2009)	  have	  termed	  ‘mainstream’	  animal	  studies	  is	  an	  inevitable	  consequence	  
of	   the	   sub-­‐discipline’s	   maturation.	   How	   strange	   that	   such	   maturation	   should	  
engender	  an	  increasingly	  polarized	  (yet	  surely	  porous	  and,	  for	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  
animal	   studies	   scholars,	   fundamentally	   false)	   binary,	   at	   a	   time	   when	   the	   early	  
anthropocentric	   constructionism	   of	   animal	   studies	   has	   genuinely	   given	   way	   to	   an	  
increasing	   recognition	   of	   the	   ‘animal-­‐as-­‐such’	   (Shapiro,	   2008),	   to	   an	   expanding	  
awareness	  of	  our	  own	   responsibilities	  and	   to	  a	  growing	   challenge	   to	   the	   simplistic	  
reductions	  of	  biologism	  (Chrulew	  2012).	  Twine’s	  concern	  that	  animal	  ethics	  becomes	  
problematic	  ‘partly	  because	  it	  implies	  a	  space	  purified	  of	  the	  ‘human’	  (Twine,	  2010:	  
31)	  might	  thus	  be	  countered	  by	  Wolfe’s	  insistence	  that	  the	  biopolitical	  point	  is	  more	  
and	   more	   the	   ‘newly	   expanded	   community	   of	   the	   living’	   (2010b:	   105).	   Twine’s	  
second	  concern,	  that	  animal	  ethics	   ‘cannot	  presume	  to	  fix	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  
‘animal’	   or	   animality’	   (ibid)	   similarly	   suggests	   the	  need	   for	   a	  more	  open	  and	   lively	  
ethical	  space,	  one	  that	  recalls	  Merleau	  Ponty’s	  interanimality	  (Dillard-­‐Wright,	  2009)	  
or,	  at	  the	  very	  least,	  challenges	  the	  idea	  of	  animals	  as	  somehow	  deserving	  of	  ethical	  
status	   because	   they	   are	   merely	   (lesser)	   others.	   The	   problem	   with	   the	   liberal	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humanist	  model,	  Wolfe	  (2010b:	  118)	  writes,	  is	  that	  ‘in	  its	  very	  attempt	  to	  recognize	  
the	  unique	  difference	  and	   specific	  ethical	   value	  of	   the	  other,	   it	   reinstates	   the	  very	  
normative	  model	  of	  subjectivity	  that	  it	   insists	   is	  the	  problem	  in	  the	  first	  place’.	  The	  
problem	  with	  the	  posthuman	  model,	  argues	  Driessen	  (2014a),	   is	  that	  we	  risk	  losing	  
any	   sense	   of	   responsibility	   and	   agency.	   In	   the	   final	   footnote	   of	   their	   introductory	  
chapter,	   Philo	   and	  Wilbert	   (2000)	  warn	   against	   overly	   simplistic	   positions,	   as	   does	  
Haraway	  (2008:	  297):	  ‘there	  is	  no	  rational	  or	  natural	  dividing	  line	  that	  will	  settle	  the	  
life-­‐and-­‐death	   relations	   between	   humans	   and	   nonhuman	   animals;	   such	   lines	   are	  
alibis	  if	  they	  are	  imagined	  to	  settle	  the	  matter	  “technically”’.	  
	  
3.	   Flourishing	  Ethics	  	  
	  
‘The	  great	  instrument	  of	  moral	  good	  is	  the	  imagination’	  (Shelley,	  1821)	  
	  
If	   animal	  geography	  has	  helped	  confound	   the	  category	  of	   the	  animal,	   it	  has	   surely	  
also	   confounded	   those	   seeming	   ethical	   universals	   that	   come	   with	   such	  
categorisation.	  In	  their	  place,	  animal	  geographers	  reveal	  and	  invigorate	  the	  contexts	  
and	  manners	  in	  which	  ethics	  are	  formed,	  performed	  and	  reformed	  through	  multiple	  	  
human-­‐animal	  interactions.	  These	  are,	  to	  use	  Whatmore’s	  (1997)	  phrase,	  ‘relational	  
ethics’,	  borne	  not	  solely	  out	  of	  pre-­‐established	  codes	  of	  moral	  behavior	  but	   rather	  
responsive	   to	   (and	   to	   some	   extent	   creative	   of)	   the	   co-­‐presence	   and	   mutual	  
corporeality	   of	   non-­‐human	   others.	   Pragmatic	   and	   responsive,	   reflecting	   Dewey’s	  
ideas	  of	  experimental	  and	  affective	  learning	  combined	  with	  moral	  imagination,	  such	  
relational	   ethics	   represent	   ‘an	   attempt	   to	   turn	   the	   tide	   of	   moral	   discussion	   from	  
questions	   of	   how	   to	   achieve	   objectivity	   and	   detachment	   to	   how	   to	   engage	  
responsively	   and	   with	   care’	   (Gilligan,	   1982:	   xix).	   Or,	   as	   Haraway	   puts	   it:	   ‘in	  
relationships,	  dogs	  and	  humans	  construct	  ‘rights’	   in	  each	  other	  such	  as	  the	  right	  to	  
demand	  respect,	  attention	  and	  response’	  	  (2003:	  53).	  	  
There	  are	  several	  dimensions	  here.	  If	  ethics	  is	  about	  mattering	  (Barad	  2007);	  
then	  animals	   can	  matter	   to	  us	   in	  many	  different	  ways	   (Roe	  2010).	  Greenough	  and	  
Roe	   (2011:50)	   argue	   for	   an	   ethics	   ‘that	   emerges	   from	   affectual,	   embodied	  
understandings	   of	   human	   and	   nonhuman	   relations’,	   what	   they	   call	   ‘somatic	  
sensibilities’	  that	  come	  from	  the	  shared	  experience	  of	  simply	  ‘having	  a	  body’.	  While	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this	  is	  slightly	  different	  from	  what	  Popke	  (2009:	  85-­‐86)	  calls	  a	  ‘non-­‐representational	  
ethics’	   through	   which	   one	   is	   ‘exposed	   to	   the	   potential	   for	   being	   otherwise’,	   it	  
nonetheless	   articulates	   with	   Popke’s	   ethos	   of	   ‘generous	   sensibility’	   that	   enlivens	  
affective	   engagement	   with	   others,	   human	   or	   non-­‐human.	   The	   animal	   scientist	  
Temple	  Grandin	   (1995)	   has	   long	   argued	   that	   the	   particular	   perceptive	   sensibilities	  
associated	   with	   her	   autism	   provide	   her	   with	   a	   unique	   understanding	   of	   the	  
perceptive	  universe	  of	   farm	  animals.	  As	  Weil	   (2006:	  96)	  argues,	  we	  see	   in	  Grandin	  
‘the	  effects	  of	  a	  posthumanist	  subjectivity	  whose	  ethical	  responsibility	  is	  determined	  
not	  by	  law	  or	  some	  repeatable	  maxim,	  but	  by	  something	  else	  that,	  as	  Derrida	  insists,	  
is	   ‘incalculable”’.	   Lulka’s	   (2012)	   search	   for	  meaning	   in	   his	   unwitting	   bisection	   of	   a	  
lizard	   with	   a	   lawnmower	   leads	   him	   to	   an	   ethics	   informed	   by	   immanence	   yet	  
ultimately	   leaves	   him	   hanging.	   Quoting	  Miguel	   (2007:	   50),	   he	   states	   ‘we	   can	   only	  
know	  life	  by	  living	  it	  (222).	   	  Here,	  an	  immanent	  ethics	  or	  perhaps	  even	  an	  ethics	  of	  
ethology	  (Sharp,	  2011:	  210)	  draws	  on	  a	  continuously	  experimental	  engagement	  with	  
what	   humans	   and	   animals	   have	   in	   common	   –	   ‘capacities	   for	   affecting	   and	   being	  
affected	  in	  this	  plane	  of	  immanence’	  (Deleuze,	  1988:	  125)	  -­‐	  rather	  than	  mitigating	  for	  
the	  effects	  of	  difference	  through	  distant	  moralities;	  a	  politics	  of	  ‘mutual	  inclusion’	  as	  
Massumi	   (2014)	   would	   have	   it	   that,	   in	   its	   way,	   recalls	   Ingold’s	   (2000)	   ethics	   of	  
dwelling	  together	  in	  a	  world	  in	  which	  trust	  replaces	  domination.	  
Writing	  of	  companion	  species,	  Haraway	  (2008:	  134)	   locates	  the	  ethical	  core	  
in	   a	   commitment	   to	   ‘flourishing’.	   Flourishing,	   she	   argues,	   entails	   compassionate	  
action,	  which,	  in	  turn	  for	  Wolfe,	  (2010b,	  p.	  122)	  is	  a	  way	  of	  ‘thinking	  ethics	  outside	  of	  
a	   model	   of	   reciprocity	   between	   ‘moral	   agents’.	   This	   is	   important	   for	   we	   cannot	  
assume	   reciprocity	   from	  non-­‐humans	  even	  when	   they	  appear	   to	   look	  back	   (Buller,	  
2013b).	  For	  Lorimer	  (2007),	  it	  is	  the	  aesthetic	  charisma	  of	  (certain)	  feral	  non-­‐humans	  
that	   engages	   our	   ethical	   and	   caring	   sensibilities;	   a	   charisma	   that	   is	   relational,	  
ethological	   and	   affective	   too.	   For	   Miele	   and	   Evans	   (2010),	   shopping	   for	   welfare-­‐
friendly	   food	   products	   becomes	   an	   act	   of	   care-­‐at-­‐a-­‐distance,	   though	   one	   that	   is	  
‘care-­‐fully’	   mediated	   by	   food	   labels.	   Finally,	   Davies	   (2012)	   offers	   a	   ‘speculative	  
ethics’	   that	   extends	   beyond	   the	  more	   coded	   and	   formal	   ethical	   procedures	   of	   lab	  
animal	  work	  to	  generate	  experimental	  cultures	  of	  care.	  All	  of	  these	  ‘caring	  practices’	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towards	  the	  non-­‐human	  entail	  ‘a	  specific	  modality	  of	  handling	  questions	  to	  do	  with	  
the	  good’	  rather	  than	  simply	  a	  ‘productive’	  justice	  (Mol	  et	  al.	  2010:	  13).	  
	  
	  
4.	   A	  final	  bark	  
	  
Animal	   geography,	   along	   with	   other	   cognate	   animal	   studies	   disciplines,	   has	   been	  
inventive	  and	  innovative	  in	  developing	  and	  exploring	  the	  multiple	  (and,	  certainly,	  in	  
places,	   contradictory,	   for	   example,	   Driessen	   2014b)	   real-­‐world	   ethical	  
entanglements	  of	  lived	  human-­‐animal	  relations.	  But	  might	  we,	  in	  our	  enthusiasm,	  go	  
too	   far?	   Barnett	   (2012),	   writing	   on	   ‘Geography	   and	   ethics’	   in	   this	   journal,	  
distinguishes	   from	  the	  aforementioned	   ‘ethics	  of	  vulnerability’	  another	  affirmative,	  
neo-­‐vitalist	  ethics	   in	  geography	  that	  acclaims	  ‘the	  generativity	  of	   life’	   (380).	   	  Popke	  
(2009)	   too	   acknowledges	   the	   prolificacy	   of	   these	   vitalist	   materialisms	   in	  
contemporary	  geography,	  yet	  he	  also	  raises	  the	  possible	   limits	  of	  an	  entirely	  open-­‐
ended	   affectivity.	   Wolfe	   (2013:104)	   warns	   against	   a	   limitless	   ethical	   purview:	   ‘An	  
affirmative	  biopolitics	  need	  not	  –	  indeed	  […]	  cannot	  –	  simply	  embrace	  “life”	  in	  all	  its	  
undifferentiated	   singularity’.	   	   Are	   all	   our	   encounters	   with	   the	   non-­‐human	   always	  
‘ethical’,	  and	  more	  so	  than	  our	  encounters	  with	  each	  other?	  	  ‘Those	  people	  with	  the	  
time	   and	   the	   ability	   to	   read	   philosophy’,	   Driessen	   (2014a,	   p.	   256)	   points	   out,	   ‘are	  
unlikely	  to	  go	  out	  in	  the	  morning	  to	  milk	  a	  herd	  of	  cows’.	  	  But	  one	  project	  of	  animal	  
geography	   is,	   to	   borrow	   from	   Law	   (2003:	   4),	   the	   using	   of	   our	   particular	   analytical	  
stance	   ‘to	   sharpen	   ethical	   questions	   about	   the	   special	   character	   of	   the	   human	  
effect’.	  
	   The	  final	   irony	   is	   that	  many	  of	  our	  ethical	  standpoints	  derive	  from	  a	  sort	  of	  
hybrid	  pantheism	  that	  celebrates	  or	  sometimes	  inverts	  what	  is	  seen	  as	  the	  inherent	  
ethical	  supremacy	  of	   the	   ‘natural’	  order.	   In	   this,	  animals	  have	  become	  our	   foil	  and	  
our	   relationship	   to	   them,	  occasionally	  distorted	  by	  ethics.	  Despret	   (2012)	   recounts	  
the	   tale	   of	   the	   ‘unnatural’	   behaviour	   of	   two	   incestuous	   otters	   at	   a	   recent	   Paris	  
exhibition.	  It	  should	  have	  been	  entirely	  ‘normal’,	  for	  these	  were	  animals	  after	  all,	  for	  
the	  otters	  not	  to	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  conform	  to	  human	  moralities	  -­‐	  for	  such	  moralities	  
distinguish	  us.	  To	  be	  human	  is	  to	  be	  ‘unnatural’	  (un-­‐animal)	  yet	  the	  natural	  (animal)	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world	  provides	  us	  with	  many	  ethical	  metaphors,	  moral	   referentials,	   virtuous	  codes	  
(Bekoff,	  2001;	  Peterson,	  2013)	  and	  perhaps,	  even	  behavioural	  models:	  
	  
‘Lately,	   ethologists	   have	   taken	   the	   trouble	   to	  watch	  wolves	   systematically,	   between	  
meal-­‐times,	  and	  have	  found	  them	  to	  be,	  by	  human	  standards,	  paragons	  of	  regularity	  
and	  virtue.	  They	  pair	   for	   life,	   they	  are	  faithful	  and	  affectionate	  spouses	  and	  parents,	  
they	   show	   great	   loyalty	   to	   their	   pack,	   great	   courage	   and	   persistence	   in	   the	   face	   of	  
difficulties,	   they	  carefully	  respect	  each	  other's	   territories,	  keep	  their	  dens	  clean,	  and	  
extremely	   seldom	   kill	   anything	   that	   they	   do	   not	   need	   for	   dinner.	   If	   they	   fight	   with	  
another	   wolf,	   the	   fight	   ends	   with	   his	   submission;	   there	   is	   normally	   a	   complete	  
inhibition	  on	  killing	  the	  suppliant	  and	  on	  attacking	  females	  and	  cubs.	  They	  have	  also,	  
like	  all	  social	  animals,	  a	  fairly	  elaborate	  etiquette,	  including	  subtly	  varied	  ceremonies	  
of	   greeting	   and	   reassurance,	   by	   which	   friendship	   is	   strengthened,	   co-­‐operation	  
achieved	  and	  the	  wheels	  of	  social	  life	  generally	  oiled’.	  (Midgley	  1973:	  114)	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